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PROBLEMS  OF  INTERDEPENDENCE  IN  A MULTIPOLAR  WORLD 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In  November  1978,  after  a  period of  extremely erratic exchange 
rate  developments,  a  phase  of  relatively smooth  exchange  rate  develop-
ments  was  ushered  in  by  the  various  understandings  concluded  with  the 
United  States  authorities.  A month  later,  with  the  launching  of  the 
European  Monetary  System,  a  new  framework  was  given  to  intra-European 
monetary  relations. 
In  October  1979,  the  Federal  Reserve  announced  that  it would 
henceforth  be  using  new  monetary  control  procedures.  Since  then  the  re-
liance  on  these  procedures  has  grown  stronger.  As  a  result,  United  States 
interest  rates  have  become  extremely  volatile  and  have  imposed  a  similar 
volatility on  an  apparently  rising  trend of  the  dollar:ECU  and  dollar:DM 
rates. 
Last  May,  the  United  States  Under-Secretary  for  Monetary  Affairs, 
Beryl  W.  Sprinkel, publicly  drew  the  conclusions  which  the  new  monetary 
control  procedures  entail  for  the  United  States  international  monetary 
policy  by  stating  before  the  Joint  Economic  Committee  the  intent  "to 
return  to  the  more  limited pre-1978  concept  of  intervention''.  Both 
Europe  and  Japan  are.  preoccupied  by·what  some  observers  cons·.ider  a 
radical  version  of  the  "benign  neglect"policy that  imposes,  de  facto,  free 
floating  interest  or  exchange  rates  ~pon  ~urope. 
This  conference  provides  an  excellent' opportunity  to detail  the 
reactions  of  a  European  to  transatlantic  monetary  events  of  the  spring  of 
1981  and  to  express  the  concerns  that  may  be  felt  in  the  Community:  sharp 
fluctuations  in  the  dollar disturb trade  between  the  Community  and  the 
United States,  may  affect  the price  of oil  and  other  primary  commodities, 
aggravate  tensions  within  the  EMS,  and  disrupt  the  coordination  of  ex-
change  and  intervention policies. 
Yet,  if  we  were  to  focus  entirely on  today's  events,  we  would 
not  do  justice to  the  complexity  and  to  the  depth  of  our  monetary 
relations. 
Indeed,  this  is not  the  first  time  that  Europeans  have  voiced 
their dislike of  American  monetary  stances.  Did  we  not  suffer  from  the 
dollar  scarcity,  from  United  States  investments  in  Europe  and  from  Amer-
ican  seignorage?  Later  the  inflationary potential of  excess  dollar 
balances  left  some  of  us  aghast  while  others  welcomed  the  United  States 
dollars  which  - at  long  last  - enabled  them  to  excape  the  balance  of 
payments  financing  constraints.  How  often  have  "substitution accounts" 
been  discussed only  to  be  replaced  by  an  excessively strong  dollar  and 
inflationary oil prices? 
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The  long  list of  European  complaints  suggests  that  we  should 
examine  the  United  States-European  monetary  relations  from  a  broader 
perspective.  Money  is  an  instrument  of  macro-economic  management.  We 
cannot  therefore  simply  limit  our  investigations  to  interest  rates, ex-
change  rates  and  to  monetary  policy,  but  we  must  ask  ourselves  more 
generally  how  our  policies  have  influenced trade  and  domestic  production. 
Furthermore,  United  States-European  relations  have  constituted the  core 
of  the  International  Monetary  System  in  the  past  and,  together  with 
Japan,  can  be  expected to  retain primary  responsibility for  world  macro-
economic  policy.  Such  a  discussion  of  United  States-European  monetary 
relations  thus  inevitably  leads  ~s to  investigate  how  - together  - they 
have  managed  both  domestic  and  world  monetary  affairs  and  to  what  extent 
their  conceptions  on  how  the  system  works  have  been  adequate  and  compatible. 
2.  THE  EMERGENCE  OF  A TRIPOLAR  WORLD 
In  the  last  twenty  years  the  relative position of  the  United 
States  in  the  world  economy  has  profoundly  changed.  While  the  Community's 
Gross  Domestic  Product  was  about  half that  of  the  United  States  in  1960, 
the  two  were  roughly  of  the  same  size  twenty  years  later  (Table  1).  During 
the  same  period,  Japan's  GOP  rose  from  some  10  per  cent  of the  United  States' 
to  about  40  per  cent.  Owing  to  these  developments  the  United  States  in-
fluenced  less  and  less  the other  two  countries  through  mere  interplay of 
economic  flows. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  United  States  has  become  more  open  to 
foreign  trade  and  services.  In  the  early  sixties,  imports  of  these  goods 
and  services  accounted  for  only  4  per  cent  of  ~nited States  GOP:  in  the 
late  seventies, this figure  had  risen  to  some  8-10 per  cent.  Community 
imports  of goods  and  services, excluding  intra-Community  trade  and  ser-
vices,  were  about  11  per  cent  at  the  beginning  of  the  sixties and  14 
towards  the  end  of  the  seventies.  Finally,  the  "openness"  of  Japan  rose 
from  some  9  to  13  per  cent  of gross  domestic  product  over  the  same  period. 
The  figures  are  influenced to  some  extent  by  the  rise  in  the  price of 
oil  which  has  led  to  an  increase  in  the  degree  of dependence  of  the 
developed  countries  on  imports.  The  respective  shares  in  world  trade 
(excluding  intra-Community  trade)  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  Community 
have  remained  remarkably  stabte  during  the  past  twenty  years,  hovering 
around  25  per  cent  for  the  Community  and  15  per  cent  for  the  United 
States.  However,  Japan's  share  rose  from  5  to 9  per  cent. 
Towards  the  end  of  the  seventies, overall  productivity  as 
measured  by  per  capita  GOP  at  current  prices  and  exchange  rates,  reached 
roughly  the  same  level  in  the  three  areas:  it  stood  at  some  ECU  7,800 
in  the  United  States  as  against  6,700  for  the  European  Economic  Community 
and  6,400  for  Japan. 
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When  we  come  to  financial  and  monetary  data  (Table  2),  the 
statistics become  more  difficult.Rough  indications  show  that,  in  spite 
of  considerable  changes  in  exchange  rate  relationships,  the  dollar 
accounted  for  some  70  per  cent  of  the  euro-currency  markets  in  1980  as 
against  80  per  cent  at  the  beginning  of  the  decade  (Bank  of  International 
Settlements  data).  However,  throughout  the  seventies,  the  euro-currency 
market  has  grown  each  year  faster  than  the  domestic  monetary  aggregates 
and  much  faster  than  nominal  GDP,  so  that  the  quantitative  importance  of 
the  dollar  in  world  finance  has  increased  whilst  the  output  of  the 
United  States  has  diminished  relatively.  The  share  of  the  DM  in official 
reserves  has  risen  from  some  6  per  cent  in  1973  to  some  12  per  cent  in 
1979.  Comparable  figures  for  the  yen  are  0.5  per  cent  in  1973  and  4  per 
cent  in  1979.  The  share  of  the  dollar  fell  from  85  to 78  per  cent. 
What  do  these  figures  tell  us? 
First,  while  the  United  States  economic  weight  has  decreased, 
its financial  importance  does  not  seem  to  have  diminished  much.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  economic  importance  of  the  Community  and  of-Japan has 
increased  considerably,  but  this  has  not  been  paralleled  in  the  finan-
cial  and  monetary  field.  These  developments  explain  the difficulties 
encountered  in  managing  world  macro-economies  as  there  is no  absolutely 
dominant  power  as  in  the  fifties,  while  the  United  States nevertheless 
still  seem  to  hold  a  preponderant  position. 
Second,  world  economic  integration  has  continued to ~ake progress 
and  has  even  accelerated;  Cyclical  and  policy  interdependence  is  high. 
The  third  conclusion  concerns  the gradually  emerging 
European  pole.  This  pole  is obviously  much  Less  coherent  than  the  other  two: 
its foreign  trade  and  GDP  aggregates  reflect  to  some  extent  only  sta-
tistical  magnitudes.  However,  the  relative decline  of  the  United  States 
economic  power  and  especially the  exchange  rate  regime  that  has  pre-
vailed  since  1973  has  brought  about  a  degree  of  individualization of  the 
Community  in  the  field of  macro-economic  policy that  did  not  previously 
exist. 
The  evolution  which  led  to  the  present  floating  regime  and  floating 
itself  have  "deprived"  individual  European  countries  of  the  organizing 
factor  represented  by  the  dollar.  After  a  long  period of  increasing  di-
vergences  and  of  a  lack  of  any  form  of  monetary  organization,  the  co-
ordination  of  monetary  and  exchange  policies  has  been  strengthened  by  the 
implementation  of  the  European  Monetary  System  which  has  thus  resulted 
in  an  increasingly  more  orderly joint  float  against  the dollar  anc  the 
yen.  This  tends  to  individualize  the  third pole  without  it  being  possible 
to  determine  its nature exactly:  for  example  whether  it  could  be  considered 
a  DM  zone,  given  the  important  role  of  Germany,  or  whether  it  could  be 
seen  as  an  ECU  zone  in  which  policy  coordination  is predominant.  The  third 
pole  manifestly  Lacks  a  widely  held  international  currency. 
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3.  INTERDPENDENCE  AND  FLOATING 
Without  taking  any  side  in  the  fixed  versus  floating  exchange 
rate  debate,  I  shall  try to  draw  from  the experience of  the  last  years 
to  emphasize  the  Links  between  policy  formulation,  external  signals  and 
market  reactions  in  an  interdependent  world  when  governments  take  account 
of  this  interdependence  in  differing  degrees. 
The  proponents  of  a  floating  exchange  rate  system  were  not  only 
a1m1ng  at  improving  the  technical  working  of  the  then  existing  system 
by  making  exchange  rate  changes  more  timely,  by  bringing  about  a  more 
adequate  exchange  rate  structure,  or  by  introducing  a  greater  degree  of 
exchange  rate  or  interest  rate  variability to  take  account  of  Larger 
capital  mobility.  They  were  also  advocating  greater  independence  for 
national  policies.  It  was  claimed  that  exchange  rate flexibility  was  a 
way  to  comply  with  what  could  be  called the  "interdependence  constraint". 
During  the  seventies  we  have  thus  observed  the  interplay of 
highly  independent  national  policies:  floating  has  not  only  streng-
thened  the  technical  ability of  central  banks  to  control  money  supply, 
it  has  also  made  it possible  for  governments  to pursue  for  longer 
periods of  time  different  national  objectives.  On  the  other  hand, 
floating  rates  have  also  brought  new  problems,  that  were  not  all ex-
pected  by  their proponents,  such  as  J  curve  effects  and  destabilizing 
capital  flows.  Such  problems  have  placed  new  and  unexpected  constraints 
on  the  elaboration of  national  policies.  . 
I  shall  single out  three  types  of  problems  that  emerge  when 
governments,  encouraged  by  floating,  follow  non-coordinated policies 
and,  to  a  great  extent,  "Let  the  rate  find  its own  Level".  Ranked  by 
decreasing  time  dimension  they  are  the  structural  and  allocation prob-
lems  posed  in  the  Long  run,  the  effects of  cyclical  divergences  on 
exchange  rates  and  trade,  and  the  dominance  of  monetary  policy  in  the 
short  run.  I  will  now  turn to  them  drawing  examples  respectively  from 
Europe,  Japan,  and  the  United  States.  I  shall  not,  indeed,  deal  with 
exchange  rate  variability on  a  day  to  day  basis  as  it  seems  to  me  that, 
within  Limits,  it  serves  a  useful  role  in  inciting portfolio managers 
to prudence. 
4.  LONGER-TERM  PROBLEMS 
Exchange  rates  are  most  often  discussed  within  a  short  term 
horizon  extending  at  most  over  a  cycle.  But  there  is also  a  very 
different  type  of  long  term  exchange  rate problem;  which  has  not  been 
discussed  much,  nor  its structural  impact  on  industry  and  on  resource 
allocation fully  assessed. 
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In  the early  seventies it was  widely  held  that  a  country  could 
support  expansionary policies by  a  depreciating  exchange  rate.  It was 
thought  that,  despite  high  inflation,  such  a  country  could  not  only 
sustain  its exports  and  hence  its employment  by  restoring  the  export 
industries'  profit margins  through  devaluations,  but  it could also 
improve  its  industrial  structure as  the profits earned  in the export 
sector would  lead  to  investment. 
To  some  extent,  Italy and  the United  Kingdom,; at  least  up  to 
1978,  followed  such  a  policy,  by  compensating  domestic  and 
imported  inflation by  an  even  faster  declining  effective exchange  rate; 
the  real  exchange  rate depreciated  sharply.  This  resulted  in  typical 
"open  scissor"  type  graphs,  such  as  those  presented  in  Chart  II. 
For  various  reasons,  however,  the experience of  the  seventies 
has  not  supported such  views  with  as  much  success  as  it 
had  been  predicted.  Firstly,  industrialists are well  aware  of  the 
temporary  nature  of  the depreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate achieved 
when  inflation  rates are  high.  They  refrain  therefore  from  investing 
their profits.  Secondly,  the depreciating  real  exchange  rate grants, 
though  only  temporarily,  a  new  lease of  life to otherwise obsolescent 
industries;  furthermore,  if  investments  are being  undertaken,  they 
may  be  misallocated to  industries that  will  turn  out  to  be  non-
competitive  once  the  exchange  rate  has  returned to a  more  normal  level. 
In  any  event,  investments  in  industries whose  profitability is mainly 
ensured  by  devaluation  do  not  contribute  much  to  the  rejuvenation of  a 
domestic industry.  Thirdly,  since  domestic  consumption  is not  cut  back 
sufficiently  by  such  a  policy,  there  is  Littl~  room  for  exports  and 
investments.  Finally,  when  inflation becomes  unb'earable  and  must  be 
reversed,  a  "stabilization crisis overshooting"  occurs and  false  signals 
are once  more  given  to  the markets,  though  in  the opposite direction 
(see  Chart  II- United  Kingdom). 
In  the opposite  sense,  continuously appreciating  real  rates, 
which  were  celebrated a  few  years  ago  as  the driving  force  behind vir-
tuous  circles also  may  give  rise to problems.  Such  a  case  is well  illu-
strated by  Germany  :  here  the  "open  scissor"  graph  in  Chart  II  is the 
inverse of  the  Italian case.  The  real  exchange  rate of  the  DM  appre-
ciated  strongly  between  1968  and  1972  in  response  to  the  realization 
that  the  dollar was  overvalued and  the the  DM  was  undervalued.  In 
1973-76  the German  stabilization effort  led to a  further  appreciation. 
After  another  bump  the  real  rate of the  DM  fell  back,  in  1981,  to  the 
1970  level,  i.e.  to a  Level  that  used  to  be  considered  undervalued • 
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The  appreciation of the  DM,  fuelled  by  capital movements  that 
were  related to the emerging  role  of the  DM  as  an  "international 
currency",  was  welcomed  because  of  its stabilizing effects on  the price 
level,  especially after the first oil  shock.  And  for  some  time,  Germany 
seemed  to  enjoy  the best  of all  worlds  as  protracted J  curves,  moderniz-
ation  and  productivity increases  in  the  export  sector prevented  the 
balance of  payments  from  being  hard  hit  by  the appreciation of  the 
currency.  However,  new  foreign  products  gradually penetrated the 
German  markets  and  finally  the  export  sector also "adjusted".  Once 
these  long  run  phenomena  began  to  make  their  influences felt,  in combi-
nation  with  those  of  the oil  shock  and  cyclical  factors,  it  became 
apparent  that  the  DM  had  been  overvalued.  It is  important  to  note that 
such  structural  effects of an  overvaluation  appear  with  a  lag  that  is 
measurable  in  a  number  of  years  rather  than  in  the  space of,  say, 
twelve  months. 
These  Long  term  or structural  overshootings  in  real  exchange 
rates  do  not  always  receive all  the attention  they  deserve given  the 
extensive misallocations of  resources  and  social  problems  that  accom-
pany  them,  perhaps  because  exchange  rate  regimes  are  discussed mainly 
by  monetary  economists  who  tend  to  follow  either  very  short  term  or 
extremely  long  run  equilibrium  approaches.  However,  they  are particu-
larly  important  in a  tripolar world  because  economies  in  such  a  world, 
being  very  large and  having  a  relatively  small  open  sector,  can  maintain 
disequilibria  for  a  long  time  before  they  become  apparent.  "Macro-
dumping"  is therefore  a  real  threat  to a  tripolar world,  because  the 
country's  expansionary monetary  policy,  via  asset  market  phenomena,  can 
"temporarily"  depress  the  real  exchange  rate  below  a  "long  run  equili-
brium"  rate.  , 
Real  exchange  rate movements  of  the dollar and  the yen,  as  illu-
strated  in  Chart  II, provide other  examples  of  such  problems. 
In  the  United  States,  the  combined  effect of  changes  in  the effec-
tive  exchange  rate and  relative  price  performance  has  resulted :in  movements  in 
the  "real" exchange  rate which  may  be  regarded as  a  measure  of price and 
cost  competitivity.  After a  rapid  improvement  between  1950  and  1952, 
the  United  States  entered a  decade  of stability in  the  real  exchange  rate. 
After  1962,  economic  activity expanded  and  productivity  rose,  but  infla-
tion  remained  subdued  and  United  States  "competitivity"  increased until 
1967.  Between  1967  and  1971,  inflation  rose  and  bottlenecks appeared. 
With  a  stable effective  exchange  rate,  competitiveness declined.  The  fall 
of the  real  exchange  rate  between  1971  and  1974  resulted  from  the combi-
nation  of  the depreciation of  the dollar and  relatively  low  inflation  rates  • 
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The  current  account  developments  of  the  United  States  do  not 
support  the  conculsions  that  could  be  drawn .from  a  superficial  reading 
of  these  indices.  Massive  surpluses  were  recorded  during  the fifties, 
when  the  United  States still enjoyed  a  considerable  technological  Lead, 
but  they  shrunk  during  the  sixties,  in  part  because  of  the  high  Level 
of  domestic  demand.  In  the  seventies  large deficits  appeared,  essentially 
for  two  reasons.  On  the  one  hand,  notwithstanding  a  strong  Lead  in 
highly  advanced  technology,  many  United  States  products  were  not  compet-
itive on  world  markets  (big  automobiles  are  one  symbol).  On  the  other 
hand,  the  United  States  began  to  import  many  consumer  goods  with  high 
income  elasticity, and  became  dependent  on  imported oil. Thus,  for  a 
Long  time,  the  decline  in  the  United  States  real  exchange  rate  was 
insufficient  to  compensate  for  the  structural  factors  which  Led  it to 
become  progressively  less  competitive. 
5.  CYCLICAL  DIVERGENCES 
Cyclical  movements  have  continued  to distinguish  economic 
activity  in  the  seventies  and  have  led  to  a  type  of  exchange  rate over-
shooting  which  can  be  contrasted  with  the  performance  of  an  exchange 
rate  system  in  which  both  national  and  international authorities  take 
a  stronger  view  on  the  exchange  rate. 
In  a  regime  under  which  governments  take  a  Longer  term  view 
of  their exchange  rates  and  act  consistently with  that  view  through 
intervention or other  instruments,  the  balance of  payments  adjustment 
mechanism  exercises  self-correcting influences  and  the  government  is  Led, 
in  due  time,to  conduct  its policy  in  a  way  favourable  to  international 
equilibrium.  When  the  rate  is  left to  float,  the  signals that  can  be 
derived  from  the  foreign  sector  may  be  alarmist  and  typical  overshooting 
spirals  can  be  observed:  the  current  account  imbalance  is  worsened  by 
J  curve,  or  inverted  J  curve,  effects.  The  current  account  performance 
then  unleashes  capital  flows  that  bring  the  exchange  rate  further  away 
from  what  would  be  a  more  adequate  level.  Eventually,  very  strong policy 
measures  must  be  adopted  to  reverse  the  situation.  These  measures  may 
be  at  the origin of  exaggeroted  movements  in  the opposite direction. 
There  are  many  examples  of  such  cyclical  problems,  and  I  shall 
illustrate the  case  of  Japan  since the  movements  of  the  yen  are  both 
recent  and  of  great  trading  interest  to  us.  Between  1976  and  1981  we 
have  witnessed  formidable  swings  in  the  value  of  the  yen  - in  both 
effective and  real  terms  - that  can  hardly be  justified in  terms  of 
either  Long  run  compefitiveness  or  relative  inflation  rates  and  which, 
although  not  exclusively of  a  cyclical  nature,  may  usefully  serve  to 
illustrate the point.  We  must  first  remember  that, until  very  recently, 
Japan  has  maintained  strong  capital  controls  so  that  the  exchange  rate 
was  mostly  influenced  by  the  current  account  and  some  short  term  capital 
movements.  In  1978,  the  Japanese  authorities  were  forced  to  Let  their  rate 
appreciate  and  took  further  expansionary measures,  in  response  to  the  Bonn 
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Summit.  Shortly  before  the  second  oil shock  unfolded,  the yen  had  already 
begun  to  fall.  This  decline was  accelerated by  the effects of  the oil shock; 
at  the  same  time,  the authorities  adopted  severely  restrictive fiscal poli-
cies but  maintained  low  interest  rates.  These  "measures"  were  strongly 
supportive of  exports,  which  rose  considerably. 
Japan's  position was  obviously difficult  because  of  its extreme 
dependence  on  oil and  also  because  of  the highly  expansionary cyclical 
position  in  which  it  found  itself and  for  which  it was  only partially 
responsible.  It was  therefore  inherently difficult  to determine an ade-
quate  new  exchange  r.ate,  especially  under  conditions of  genuine  uncertainty. 
Yet,  the  floating  exchange  rate  system  appears  to  have  increased 
rather  than  reduced  this uncertainty.  Firstly,  important  J  curve  effects 
considerably magnified  the  swing  in  the  exchange  rate.  Secondly,  the 
absence  of a  strong  view  of the  rate  by  the  government,  its foreign part-
ners and  by  international authorities,  increased market  uncertainty. 
Thirdly,  floating  and  controls  helped  the  Government  to maintain artifi-
cially depressed  interest  rates;  the  huge  foreign  exchange  intervention 
of the  Bank  of  Japan  had  thus  reduced  effects.  In  a  system  of  jointly 
managed  rates,  the question  of  the "rate to  hold"  would  have  come  up, 
monetary  policy would  have  had  to  tighten  interest  rates,  and  interven-
tions,  if necessary  supported  by  official borrowing,  might  have  been  more 
substantial. 
There  are  consequences  that  cannot,  in  the  real  world,  be  disso-
ciated from  the  enormous  swings  in  the  yen  :  the  low  level  of the yen  in 
1979  and  in  early  1980  has  contributed  to  foster,Japanese market  penetra-
tion  in  Europe  to a  degree  that  is  perhaps  not  warranted  by  longer  term 
trends  in  Japanese  price and  cost  competitivity and  has  nurtured protec-
tionist  feelings  and  reactions.  This  large  swing  has  thus  exerted  lasting 
real  effects  that  would  have  been  avoided  if the  Japanese government  and 
the  international  community  had  taken  a  different  view  of  the yen  and  of 
policy co-ordination. 
This  example  illustrates the  problems  that  emerge  from  the pur-
suit  of  "an  independent  policy course  in an  interdependent  world".  The 
rapid  correction of  the  imbalance  in  Japan's  current  account  - desirable 
as  it may  be  from  this nation's  individual  standpoint  - was  only  a  tempo-
rary  benefit  because  it gave  rise to  far-reaching  secondary  reactions of 
a  protectionist nature. 
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9. 
6.  MONETARY  POLICY:  TODAY'S  DEVELOPMENTS 
The  third type  of  problem  is  illustrated best  by  the  events  of 
the  last  weeks  and  months  and  relates to  the  question  raised  by  the  recent 
course  of  monetary  policy  in  the  United  States. 
As  is  shown  in  chart  III,  in  the  two  years  since  the  start of  the 
European  Monetary  System  there  have  been  substantial  fluctuations  of  the 
dollar  against  Community  currencies.  During  the  first  few  months  of  the 
European  Monetary  System  the  dollar  was  on  a  rising  trend  but  this  was 
soon  reversed  and  in  the  second  half  of  1979  the  dollar  fell  sharply,  by 
over  5  per  cent  against  the  ECU.  In  1980  the  increased volatility of 
United  States'  interest  rates - associated  with  the  change  in  the  tech-
niques  of  monetary  control  initiated the  previous  October  - gave  rise to 
more  pronounced  fluctuations  in  the  dollar.  In  the  first  quarter  of  1980 
the  dollar  rose  by  10.4 per  cent  against  the  ECU,  but  then  fell  sharply 
by  9  per  cent  in  the  second  quarter.  In  the  second  half  of  1980  through 
to  mid-February  1981  the  dollar  rose  once  more,  appreciating  by  nearly 
24  per  cent  against  the  ECU.  Subsequently  and  as  a  result  of  further 
interest  rate  increases  in  Europe,  the  dollar  fell  by  4.4 per  cent  to  the 
end  of  March.  We  have  all  witnessed  the  latest  resurgence  of  the  dollar 
which  has  risen  by  about  10  per  cent  in  the  two  months  between  end  March  and 
end  May,  in  tandem  with  yet  another  upward  swing  in  United  States  interest 
rates. 
These  sharp  fluctuatio~s  in  the dollar  are  a  cause  of  concern  to 
the  Community;  firstly  because  of  the  direct  - albeit  lagged  - effects on 
trade  betweenthe Community  and  the  United  States  and  of  U.S.  competition 
with  the  Community  in  external  markets;  secondly  because  of  the  possible 
effects of  dollar  fluctuations  on the prices  and  cost  of  primary  products, 
particularly oil;  and  thirdly because  sharp  external  currency  movements 
can  aggravate  tensions  within  the  European  Monetary  System  and  disturb 
coordination  of  exchange  rates  and  intervention policies. 
The  influence  of  fluctuations  in  the  dollar:DM  exchange  rate  on 
the  relative position of  currencies  within  the  European  Monetary  System 
band  can  be  seen  in  chart  IV.  When  the  mark  has  been  strong  against  the 
dollar  it  has  often  been  strong  against  other  European  Monetary  System 
currencies  and  when  it  has  been  weak  against  the  dollar  it  has  been  weak 
within the European  Monetary  System  band.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
DM  is  a  closer  substitute of  the dollar  than  other  Community  currencies, 
and,  therefore,  any  "flight"  from  the  dollar  is  accompanied  by  a  movement 
into  the  DM  and  vice-versa.  Of  course,  only  a  part  of  European  Monetary 
System  tensions  are  due  to this  dollar:DM  relationship  and  I  am  personally 
convincedthat  the  lack  of  a  "dollar policy"  is too often  blamed  for  diffi-
culties  and  tensions  that  are  due  to our  own  making.  This  does  not  reduce, 
however,  the  relevance  of  the  phenomenon. 
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The  same  degree  of  volatility  can  be  observed  in  United  States 
and  European  nominal  and  real  interest  rates. 
The  extreme  volatility of  United  States nominal  interest  rates 
in  the period  from  the  end  of  1979  until  now  is  well-known  and  is illu-
strated  in  chart  III.  The  effect  on  European  interest  rates  is  also 
shown  in  that  chart  where  it  can  be  seen  that  European  countries  have 
been  forced  somewhat  to  follow  the  American  developments,  although 
attempting  to  dampen  them  down  as  much  as possible. 
What  is  less  widely  realized  is  that  real  interest  rates  have 
fluctu.ated  widely  as well.  In  the  United  StateSTchart  V)  ex-post  real 
inte~t rates  have  climbed  from  broadly  zero  at  the  beginning  of  1979 
to  a  peak  of  about  4 per  cent  by  the  end  of  1980  and  well  in  excess of  5  per 
cent  more  recently.  In  Germany,  taken  as  a  representative ~uropean country  the 
ex-ante  real  rate  of  interest  has  recently  reached  record  levels.  It  is  ' 
hard  to  reconcile  such  volatility of  real  interest  rates  with  any  clear 
policy objective. 
.  In. a  situation.  of  very  high  financial  interdependence,  ·fhe  ups  and 
downs  1n  Un1ted  States  1nterest  and  exchange  rates  confront  the  ~ 
European  Community  with  difficult  choices.  It  could eliminate exchange 
rate  volatility vis-a-vis  the dollar  by  pegging  its interest  rates  to 
United  States  interest  rates.  In  this  case  the  Community  would  be  guided 
by  a  variable  the  movements  of  which  are  explicitly disregarded  as 
meaningless  by  the  very  authorities  who  determine  them.  Moreover,  both 
European  interest  rates  and  money  supply  would  be  determined  by 
short  run  domestic  developments  in  the  United  States  and  by  the personal-
ities  and  institutions of  that  country.  Alternatively,  the  Community 
could  itself adopt  the  United  States procedures  of giving  absolute 
priority to  quantity-oriented monetary  control;  exchange  rate volatility 
could  then  be  compounded.  Imagine  the  extreme  case  in  which  all  major 
countries  adopted  United  States procedures:  in  these  periods  when  short 
term  economic  fluctuations  failed  to offset  one  another,  there  would  be 
extreme  exchange  rate  volatility.  It  seems  highly  unlikely  that private 
speculators  would  even  it out.  Thus  we  seem  to  be  left  with  no  other 
choice  than  the  one  we  are  making  in practice,  and  that  consists of  a 
mixture  of  devaluation  and  restrictive policies, of  passivity,  soli-
darity  and  expressions  of  concern. 
We  must  be  able  to  find  a  way  to  subdue  these  strains  by  an 
enhanced  coordination  of  our  monetary  policies.  We  have  lost,  as  I  have 
illustrated above,  the  "dominant  country"  method  of  organizing  inter-
national  monetary  relationships.  We  have  lost  faith  in  organizing  the 
world  around perfectly flexible  exchange  rates.  As  a  consequence  we  must 
be  capable  of  finding  a  new  solid principle  around  which  to  organize 
international.monetary matters.  Just  because  we  have  no  ready  solutio~ 
the  problem  w1ll  not  go  away. 
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The  first  change  which  is  needed  in  this  respect  is one  of atti-
tudes.  There  was  a  period  when  "international  cooperation"  was  in  fashion; 
now  in  some  quarters,  the  pendulum  has  moved  to the  extreme  in  which  the 
wise  maxim  "put  your  own  house  in  order  first"  is cparicaturized  as  meaning 
that  the external  aspects  of  monetary  policy  are  not  merely  to  be  ignored 
but  are  indeed  irrelevant.  I  believe  that  we  should  be  able  to  find  a 
solution  in  which  a  recogniti~n of  the  consequences  for  trade  relation~ 
ships  of  pol icy  actions  on our  partners  is  in  some  way  integrated  in 
the  process  of  policy  formulation. 
A change  of  attitude is,  however,  not  enough.  It  is necessary  to 
pursue  some  systematic  improvement  in  the  way  monetary  actions  are  co-
ordinated  among  the  three  poles  of  which  I  spoke  before. 
7.  UNITED  STATES  MONETARY  POLICY  AS  SEEN  FROM  EUROPE:  A)  OBJECTIVES 
From  the  abandonment  of  simple  rules  for  international  monetary 
coordination,  such  as  fixed  on  freely  floating  exchange  rates,  one 
should  certainly not  draw  the  negative  conclusion that  coordination  is 
unnecessary  or  autO'iiiatically  assured  by  ensuring  "domestic  order".  Inter-
dependence  is still there  and  would  require  appropriate  action  even  among 
perfectly stable  and  well-managed  economies,  as  Long  as  economic  policies 
are  actively  conducted  in  each  of  them.  Instead of that  negative  con-
clusion,  two  positive  conclusions  have  to  be  drawn  from  the  existing 
state of  monetary  relationships. 
Firstly, that  a  much  wider  range  of  policies, objectives,  instru-
ments,etc.  have  to  be  discussed  in  the  fora  where•officials  discuss  prob-
lems  stemming  from  interdependence.  An  exchange  rate  rule  was  a  simple 
way,  perhaps  too  simple  for  our  complex  world,  to  summarize  the  Links 
between  partners.  Today  we  have  to  engage  on  themuch  more  complicated 
and  politically delicate exercise  of  discussing  and  comparing  our  policies 
in  all their  aspects  including  some  which  have  a  less  evident  relation-
ship-with the  external  sector,  Like  the  techniques  adopted  for  monetary 
control. 
Secondly,  to  the  extent  to  which  the  recognition of  interdepen-
dence  involves  not  only  an  exchange  of  information  but  also  Leads  to 
action  or to  changes  that  are,  in  substance,  acts of  international 
policy,  then  this  is  closer  to  the  "discretionary pole"  of  the  rule  vs. 
discretion  spectrum  than  it would  be  under  the  simple,  objective  regime 
of  an  exchange  rate  rule. 
For  both  these  reasons,  international  policy  coordination  has 
become  more  difficult,  not  less  necessary,  tha~ inthepast  and  it  re-
quires  that  we  go  rather  deeply  into  each  others  "internal  affairs" • 
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To  do  so,  I  shall  offer  a  commented  text-book  description of 
the  United  States  monetary  policy  since  October  1979,  when  the  Fed 
changed  its operating  procedure,  to  see  at  what  Level  a  European  ob-
server  may  have  disagreements  with  his  transatlantic  friends. 
The  first  aspect  of  the  new  American  monetary  policy  is the 
increased  weight  attributed to  the  final  objective of  restraining  in-
flation. 
One  must  always  be  wary  of  dubbing  policy declarations  as  his-
torical  events  and  I  could  not  accept  that  the October  1979  measures 
signal  the  final  burial  of  Keynesian  monetary  policy.  The  great  English 
economist  has  been  buried  so  many  times  already  in  the  last  few  years 
that  it  reminds  me  of  the  phrase  that  Italo Svevo  attributed to one  of 
his  characters:  "to  stop  smoking  is  very  easy,  I  have  already  done  it 
several  times  ••• ".  However,  even  without  proclaiming  that  a  new  monet-
ary  era  has  begun  in  October  1979,  I  think  it  is  safe  to  say  that  a 
shift  of  emphasis  took  place  on  that  date  and  that  short-term  support 
of  economic  activity  lost  weight,  in  favour  of price stability,  in  the 
complex  of objectives  pursued  by  means  of  monetary  policy. 
There  is  little to  disagree  with  this  change  of  emphasis.  I 
think  it  is  now  accepted  by  economists  of  all  "schools"  that  money  is, 
so  to  speak,  an  input  to  the production,  investment  and  consumption 
process  and  that  its efficiency  as  an  input  depends  on  its stability. 
This  means  that  inflation  hampers  growth  in  a  basic,  structural  sense 
and  that  the  short  term  benefits  to  be  obtained  by  pumping  money  into 
the  economy  are  not  worth  the  long  term  costs of'inflation. 
It  is  with  some  European  pride that  I  can  point  out  that  some 
European  countries,  Germany  and  the  Benelux  countries  in  the  EEC  and 
Switzerland  and  Austria  outside it, understood this  very  early  and  their 
relative  success  is one  important  reason  why  other  countries  are  now 
more  convincedin their opposition  to  inflation. 
Not  having  found  anything  to  disagree  within  the  final  objective 
of  United  States  monetary  policy,  Let's  consider  the  so-called  inter-
mediate  target  variables. 
These  are  expressed  in  the  United  States  as  rates  of  increase 
in  the  monetary  aggregates  which  are  set  normally  for  the period  from 
the  last  quarter  of  the  present  year  to  the  Last  quarter  of  the  year 
ahead.  Target  ranges  are  set  for  narrow  and  wider  definitions of  the 
money  supply.  The  actual  numbers  for  the  Lower  and  upper  range  for  each 
aggregate  are  rates  of  increase  thought  compatible  with,  and  necessary 
for,  the  achievement·of  the  final  targets. 
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The  philosophy  behind  the  fixing  of these targets  has  been  expres-
sed  at  the highest  level  by  the  Chairman  of  the Board  of Governors  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  before  the  Senate  Banking  Committee  :  "Our  intent  is not 
to accommodate  inflationary forces;  rather  we  mean  to exert  continuing 
restraint  on  growth  in  money  and  credit  to  squeeze out  inflationary pres-
sures.  That  posture  should  be  reflected  in  further  deceleration  in  the 
monetary  aggregates  in  the  years  ahead,  and  is an  essential  ingredient 
in  any  effective policy to  restore price stability".  However  he  added  : 
"I  know  that  the case  is  sometimes  made  that  monetary  policy  can  alone 
deal  with  the  inflation  side  of  the equation.  But  not  in  the  real  world  -
not  if other  policies pull  in other directions,  feeding  inflationary 
expectations,  propelling  the  cost  and  wage  structure  upwards,  and  placing 
enormous  burdens  on  financial  markets  with  large  budgetary deficits into 
the  indefinite future". 
Another  high  exponent  of  the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee, 
Anthony  Solomon,  has  put  it  in  these  terms  :  "Gradual  reduction of  money 
and  credit  growth  as  the  centrepiece of  broad monetary  strategy has  indeed 
almost  ceased  to  be  a  matter  of  controversy.  In  a  period of  prolonged 
and  substantial  inflation,  virtually all  schools  of  economic  thought  can 
accept  such  an  approach  and  I  certainly do  myself.  But  I  would  like to 
suggest  that  it would  be  a  mistake  to  assume  that  slowing  monetary  growth 
by  itself offers a  simple or painless, purely  "technical",  solution to 
our  inflation problem •••••  On  the whole,  the  experience abroad  tends  to 
confirm  the  suspicion  that  slowing  monetary  growth  by  itself may  not  be 
enough  to  control  price  inflation within acceptable periods of  time  and 
without  unacceptable  side effects.  A good  record on  achieving  money 
growth  targets  has  not  necessarily ensured a  good  performance  on  the 
inflation  front  - and  conversely.  Over  periods  of  up  to three or  four 
years,  there  seems  to  be  at  best  only  a  rather  Loose  relationship between 
the growth  of  the aggregates  and  price inflation.  Over  Longer  periods, 
to.be sure,  the  relationship  is  closer". 
I  find  it very difficult  to disagree  with  these well  balanced 
statements  and  Alexander  Lamfalussy,  distilling  recent  monetary  policy 
experiences,  especially  European  ones,  has  reached  very  similar con-
clusions. 
8.  b)  TECHNIQUES 
Looking  for  disagreements  between  Europe  and  the  United  States  we 
have  therefore  to go  further  through  our  textbook  description and  examine 
the  so-called operating  target. 
Under  the pre-October  1979  method,  the  Trading  Desk  in  New  York 
operated  to  peg  the  Federal  Fund's  rate,  i.e.  the  interest  rate  charged  by 
banks  with  excess  reserves  for  Lending  them  to  banks  in  need  to  bring 
their balances  with  the  Federal  Reserve  bank  up  to  the  required  Level. 
The  drawback  of adopting  a  level  of  interest  rates as  a  short-term operat-
ing  target  was  that  in order  to  keep  this  rate within its tolerance  range 
the manager  of  the open  market  desk  had  to  supply  any  amount  of  reserve~ 
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to  the  banking  system  which  in  demand  for  by  the  banks  at  that  level  of 
the  Federal  Funds  rate.  Whenever  the money  supply  was  rising strongly, 
banks'  demand  for  Federal  Funds  increased  equally and  open  market  pur-
chases  had  to  be  stepped  up  to  prevent  the  Federal  Funds  rate  from  moving 
outside  its  tolerance  range.  In  addition,  there  was  some  reluctance by 
the  Federal  Reserve  Board  to adjust,at  its monthly  meetings,the tolerance 
range  speedily  and  by  sufficient amounts  to correct  deviations  in  the 
money  supply  from  its target  path,  partly because  it was  not  always  clear 
if the deviations  in  the money  supply  figures  were  only  temporary aberrat-
ions  likely  to  reverse  themselves,  or  on  the contrary more  fundamental 
changes  in  trends,  partly because  the  interest  rate was  regarded as  a 
politically sensitive  indicator.  Consequently,  frequent  short-term 
deviations  in  the money  supply  led  to  an  erosion  of  public  confidence, 
especially  in a  period of  rising  inflationary pressures,  in  the willing-
ness  or  the ability of  the  Federal  Reserve  to stick  to its own  targets. 
The  new  operating  target  adopted  on  6  October  1979  is  the amount 
of  unborrowed  reserves  supplied to  the  banking  system  through  open  market 
transactions.  There  is still a  tolerance  range  for  the  upper  and  lower 
level  of  the  Federal  Funds  rate,  but  this  range  is  now  so  wide  (e.g. 
from  8.5  to 14  percent  in  June  1980)  that  the  rate  is  largely  left  to 
find  its own  level.  Thus,  in order  to gain control  over  reserves  supplied 
to  the  banking  system,  the  Federal  Reserve  has  more  or  less  abandoned 
discretionary control  over  the  level  of  interest  rates. 
The  Federal  Reserve  is  careful  to  point  out  that  there  is nothing 
sacred  in  the  new  rule  and  it is  supposed  to  be  applied  "cum  grano salis". 
In  front  of the  Senate  Committee,  Chairman  Volcken  emphasized  "that  swings 
in  the money  and  credit aggregates  over  a  month,  a  quarter or  even  longer 
should  not  be  disturbing,  provided  there  is understanding  and  confidence 
in  our  intentions over  more  significant  periods of  time".  Anthony  Solomon 
goes  as  far  as  commenting  that  the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee  had  exagger-
ated  in  pursuing  monetary  targets during  the  second quarter of 1980,  caus-
ing  unnecessary downswings  of  the  interest  rates. 
Even  with  these  qualifications,  however,  there  is possibly a  diffe-
rence  of  emphasis  between  Europeans  and  Americans  on  the  importance to  be 
given  to  money  aggregates  and  interest  rates  in  conducting  monetary  policy. 
I  say  "between  Europeans  and  Americans"  because  this  is both  the  subject 
of  today's  seminar  and,  I  would  say,  the  geographical  distinction of  the 
arguments.  It  is  necessary,  however,  not  to  forget  the existence of all 
those  who  take  a  radical  "quantity"  view  on  this side of the Atlantic  as 
well  as  of  those  who  continue  to advocate  a  more  price-oriented approach 
in  the  United  States. 
The  first  reason  which  would  justify paying  greater attention  to 
interest  rates  is somewhat  pedestrian but,  in  my  view,  important.  That  is 
that  while  everybody  knows  what  an  interest  rate is, the price they 
pay  (receive)  to  borrow  (Lend)  money,  the  issue of what  is money  is in contrast 
much  more  complicated,  both  conceptually and  statistically.  A casual  took 
at  the  several  definitions of  money  in a  given  economy  (not  to  speak of. 
inter-country differences)  is enough  to  prove  this statement.  Some  recent 
difficulties  created by  the  development  of  new  financial  assets,  especially 
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in  the  United  States  (NOW  accounts)  or  the peculiar effects created by 
the  Lifting of  quantitative controls  (the "corset")  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
just  make  this  eternal  problem  worse.  A small  sign of this difficulty is 
the  fact  that  Paul  Volcker,  in  front  of a  Senate  Committee,  had  to  spend 
something  Like  three of  his  total  eleven pages  just to  show  how  M1A  and 
M1B  figures  were  altered by  the growth  of  NOW  accounts.  Close  to  this 
reason  is  the  fact  that  interest  rates are observed continuously without 
delay. 
A second  reason  is that  interest  rates are,  so  to  speak,  a  univer-
sal  variable  while  monetary  aggregates  are  much  more  segmented.  A change 
in  the  rate affects all market  participants,  having  widespread  consequen-
ces  in  terms  of  relative costs,  resource allocation,  and  economic  beha-
viour.  This  is  not  so  for  a  temporary  deviation of a  monetary  aggregate 
from  the  chosen  path.  If a  few  billion of  whatever  M you  Like  are  Lying 
somewhere  in  the  economy  for  some  time  nothing  happens,  nobody's  behaviour 
is  really affected.  To  seek  control  of  the aggregates  instant  by  instant, 
dollar  by  dollar  would  be  to  ignore  realities and  to  produce  more  shocks 
and  uncertainties  than  it eliminates. 
If demand  curves  were  stable and  known,  there would  be  a  known 
one  to  one  correspondence  between  price and  quantity and  it would  make 
no  difference which  of  the axes  one  looks  at.  As  they  are  not,  we  do  not 
exactly  know  what  price corresponds  to what  quantity and  hence  we  have 
to  choose  what  to  control.  Now,  one  has  to  believe  that  demand  curves 
are  very  very  thick  indeed  to  be  ready  to  accept  a  succession  of  swings 
of about  ten  percentage  points without  suspecting  that  a  change  in mone-
tary  stance goes  with  them.  But,  if curves  are  sa thick,  why  should  the 
"play"  of  a  point  on  the  curve  be  dramatically  important  for quantities 
and  quite  irrelevant  for  the  rate  ? 
If one  believes that  in  the  Long-run  the  demand  for  money  is 
rather  stable,  one  would  tend  to avoid  huge  swings  in  interest  rates 
also  as  part  of a  well-balanced  "aggregate-oriented" monetary  policy. 
A look  at  "real"  interest  rates  may  be  a  useful  guidance  to  those  who 
think  that  prices affect  economic  behaviour. 
One  could  go  further  down  to  even  narrower  issues  such  as  the 
opportunity of  contemporaneous  reserve  accounting  or  the adjustment  in 
the  path  for  non-borrowed  reserves  and  the  like,  which  are actually dis-
cussed  within and  outside the  Federal  Reserve.  But  that  would  go  beyond 
the  scale of  this paper  and  it would  also  implicitly  suggest  that  the 
difficult  problems  of  world  economic  interdependence  can  be  solved at 
the  lowest  level  of technicalities. 
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9. C)  EX CHANG£  RATES 
A Last  issue  is,  in a  sense,  the corollary of the emphasis  put 
on  aggregates  in performing  American  monetary  policy  :  the policy of 
free  floating  on  the  foreign  exchange  market. 
I  think  that  in  this domain  the differences between  "American 
and  Europe~ms", where  again  I  use  the  terms  as  shorthand devices,  are 
more  than  just  a  matter  of  emphasis. 
The  Under-Secretary  in  the Treasury,  Mr.  B.  Sprinkel,  has  offi-
cially declared  that  the  United  States"  •••  intend  to  return  to the more 
Limited  pre-1978  concept  of  interventions by  intervening  only  when  neces-
sary  to  counter  conditions of disorder  in  the market''.  In  November  1978, 
as  it will  be  remembered,  after a  dramatic  run-down  on  the dollar,  the 
Carter  administration  had  announced  the ·commitment  to a  more  active 
intervention policy.  The  new  policy is, therefore,  a  return  to the status 
quo  ante. 
The  position  in  Europe  is,  in  this  respect,  traditionally  diff~­
ent  from  the  one  described  by  Under-Secretary  B.  Sprinkel. 
A first  reason,  peculiar  to  Europe,  is that,  as  I  have  shownabove, 
Europe  is much  more  open  to  international  trade than  the  United  States. 
As  a  consequence  of that,  exchange  rate changes  have  very  Large  and  rapid 
effects on  inflation  rates and,  therefore,  an  "eye"  on  the  exchange  rate 
is  an  "eye"  (possibly  a  very  sharp  one)  on  inflation,  and  avoiding  excess-
ive  depreciations means  subduing  inflationary tensions. 
There  are,  however,  also  more  general  reasons.  Some  are  the  same, 
mutatis  mutandis,  as  those mentioned  above  as  regards  the  relative weight 
of  interest  rates and  money  aggregates  in conducting  monetary  policy.  Let 
me  just  underline  that  the  fact  that  you  have  to give  a  certain quantity 
of,  say,  DMs  to  have  one  dollar  is  much  more  "solid"  than  the  fact  that  a 
money  aggregate  has  grown  by  X percent  in a  given  period. 
There  is finally,  a  somewhat  more  philosophical  argument. involved. 
Under-Secretary  Sprinkel  made  it clear that  the  new  administration  does 
not  favour  interventions  because  :  "Significant and  frequent  interventions 
by  governments  assume  that  a  relatively  few  officials  know  better where 
exchange  rates  should  (or  should  not)  be  than a  large number  of  decisions-
makers  in  the  market,  and  that  public  funds  should  be  put  at  risk  on  the 
basis of  that  assumption". 
It  is clear to  me  that  the  (price)  result  of  a  competitive  market 
is  a  very  weighty  variable,  being,  indeed,  the  end  result of a  very  large 
number  of  transactions.  This  does  not  imply,  however,  that  one  cannot  have 
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one'sown  idea  on  the "right"  price and  bet  on  it.  Indeed operators  do  this 
all  the  time;  just think  what  would  be  the  turnover of,  say,  the  Chicago 
futures  market  if people  did  not  have  their  own  idea  and  did  not  act  on 
it.<*) 
But  if we  admit  that  anyone  can  make  his  own  idea  about  the  ~pprop­
riateness  of  the  "market  price"  without  being  accused  of  "lese-majeste", 
why  should  we  just exclude  from  the  game  the  arm  of collective  judgment 
(is  not  the  government  just this?).  To  admit  that  the game  is tough  and 
competition  stiff does  not  mean  that  one  should  not  even  enter  the  ring. 
In  addition,  intervention  may  be  needed  to  avoid disruptions  to 
trade  and  inconsistency with  fundamental  economic  factors.  Quite apart 
from  cases  of  erratic  movements  due  to  disorderly market  conditions, cir-
cumstances  may  arise where  intervention  designed  to  dampen  exchange  rate 
variations will  be  opportune. 
Large  and  sudden  changes  in  the  exchange  rate can  disrupt  trade 
relationships  between  countries  by  altering  competitive conditions  in  a 
manner  which  does  not  reflect  changes  in  relative costs, factor  endowment 
and  other  "fundamental"  factors.  In  these cases,  there  is a  danger  of 
protectionist pressures,  which  can  trigger a  chain  reaction  limiting  the 
free  flow  of  trade,  exacerbating  inflation and  seriously  hampering  growth. 
In  such  circumstances,  even  in  the absence of evident  disorderly condi-
tions,  action  designed  to  restrain or  slow  down  movement  of the  rate 
may  be  required. 
However,  dramatic  changes  in  the  exchange rate can  spotlight, 
often  more  sharply  and  opportunely  than  other  variables,  deep  economic 
changes  in  the  country  concerned as  compared  with  others.  In  certain 
cases  such  exchange  rate movements  will  be  acceptable  because  they  reflect 
explicit  policy  choices  (such  as  a  revaluation  for  the currency of a  low 
inflation country).  Nevertheless,  if a  movement  is very  sharp  and  sudden 
••• I •.• 
(*)  In  theoretical  terms,  the same  point  has  been  made  very clearly by 
Grossmann  and  Stiglitz  :  ''If  competitive  equilibrium  is  defined as 
a  situation  in  which  prices are  such  that all arbitrage profits are 
eliminated,  is it possible  that  a  competitive  economy  always  be  in 
equilibrium  ?  Clearly not,  for  then  those  who  arbitrage make  no 
(private)  return  from  their  (privately)  costly activity.  Hence  the 
assumptions  that  all  markets  are  always  in  equilibrium and  always 
perfectly arbitraged are  inconsistent  when  arbitrage  is  costly~" 
(Sanford J.  Grossmann  and  Joseph  E.  Stiglitz,  On  the  impossibility 
of  informationally efficient market  :  American  Economic  R~view, 
June  1980,  val. 70,  N°  3,  pp.  393-408. 18. 
it will  generally  be  unwelcome  to  the country concerned.  In  such  circum-
stances,  intervention aimed  at  damping  the movement  may  be  beneficial, 
although  it should  be  underlined  that  the  border  line between  "leaning 
against  the wind"  and  "manipulation" of  exchange  rates  is very  easy  to 
trespass  and  therefore great  care  has  to be  put  in performing  this kind 
of  intervention. 
Any  action  aimed  directly at  the exchange  rate will  spill over 
into other  fields,  even  if the authorities attempt  to offset  its direct 
effects on  internal  monetary  conditions.  In  particular,  conflicts may 
arise between  the  exchange  rate objectives and  aggregate-oriented mone-
tary policies or  interest  rate policies.  The  existence of these spill-
over  effects  implies  that,  in  general,  a  compromise  will  have  to  be  found 
between  exchange  rates and  other objectives of  economic  policy.  It also 
implies  that  policy actions  in  other  fields will  influence the  exchange 
rate.  As  a  consequence  any  exchange  rate policy  has  to  be  seen  as  a 
component  of overall  economic  policy whose  internal  consistency has  to 
be  preserved. 19.-
10.  CONCLUSIONS 
I  shall try to  summarize  my  remarks  in a  few  points. 
First, the  world  monetary  and  economic  order  that  prevailed  in 
the  first  two  post-war  decades  has  disappeared  in  the  seventies.  The  break 
of  the  double,  fixed  link,between  gold  and  the dollar,  and  between  the 
dollar  and  the  other  currencie~  the  emergence  of  a  multicurrency  reserve 
system,  the  floating  of  exchange  rates,  the  shift  of  the  power  to  fix 
energy  prices  from  oil  companies  to  OPEC,  are all  at  the  same  time  manif-
estations  and  causes  of  the  end  of  that  order.  They  are  interrelated 
expressions  of  the  same  historical  developments. 
Second,  that  order  has  not  been  replaced  by  a  new  one.  Inter-
dependence  being  as  close  as  before,  and  probably  closer,  an  organization 
to grant  "peaceful"  economic  and  monetary  relationships  is  as  necessary 
as  it  was  under  the  old order  provided  by  the  "pax  americana". 
Third,  in  the existing  world  institutional  setting, problems 
stemming  from  interdependence  can  only  be  dealt  with  by  way  of  bi- and 
multilateral  consultations,  in  the  (perhaps  too)  numerous  fora  where 
officials  and/or  politicians meet:  OECD,  IMF,  ~  10,  Summits,  etc.  The 
assumption  on  which  such  consultations  are  made  is an  acceptance  of  the 
proposition  that  each  member's  policies  have  effects on  th~r partners, 
and  that  it  may  not  always  be  true that  what  is good  for  one  is good 
for  the  others.A  denial  of  this proposition  by  one  of  the partners  is 
a  dangerous  step, particularly when  none  of  the partners  is sufficiently 
strong  and  well-behaved  to  impose  order  on  the others. 
Fourth,when  there  are  no  agreed  rules  (like,  in  the past,  fixed 
exchange  rates),  and  severe  stagflation makes  policy  choices politically 
very  hard,  consultations  are  a  difficult  and  fragile  instrument  to  deal 
with  interdependence.  In  such  circumstances,  consultations  have  to 
touch  upon  a  wide  range  of  policy objectives,  instruments,  and  techniques. 
Fifth,  if asked  to  speak  about  US  policies  in  a  consultation 
round,  I  would  say  that  there  is  Little  reason  for  a  European  todisagree 
either  with  the  high  priority given  to  anti-inflation-. policy  in the 
US,  or  with  the  importance  given  to  the  control  of  monetary  aggregates. 
However,  the  choice  of  techniques  of  monetary  control  unnecessarily 
increases  the  strains  imposed  by  a  tough  monetary  policy  both  on  the 
economic  system  and  on  the external  partners.  The  relief  coming  from 
improved  techniques  would,  however,  be  marginal.  On  the  other  hand,  an 
approach  to  exchange  rate policy  based  on  a  rule  of  no  intervention  is 
hard  to  accept  for  European  countries.  As  the  exchange  rate  involves 
two  currencies,  disagreement  in this area  is particularly undesirable • 
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Sixth,  and  last, the  fact  that  there  may  be  only  limited dis-
agreement  on  u.s.  policies  means  that  we  recognize  that  these policies 
are  good  for  the u.s.  It  does  not  mean  that  they  are  good  for  their part-
ners,  or  that  they  do  not  hurt:-For  several  European  countries,  in parti-
cular,  the  level  of  real  interest  rates  necessary to  keep  their  currency 
from  depreciating  to  a  level  inconsistent  with  economic  fundamentals,  is 
much  higher  than  the  level  required  for  domestic  reasons. 
Thus,  the  ball  comes  back  into our  court.  What  can  we  Europeans 
do  to get  out  of  this  impasse?  Two  things,  I  would  say:  to  show  that  our 
approach  works  in practice  and  to  be  united.  And,  I  would  add,  these  two 
things  Largely  coincide.  That  opens  up  another  field,  that  I  shall  not 
explore  here.  But,  to put  in  a  nutshell  what  ought  to  be  said  in  this 
respect,  I  could  find  no  better  words  than  those  used  by  Anthony  Solomon 
Less  than  two  years  ago: 
"If  we  can't  lead  the  way,  through  meaningful  policy  coordination 
between  the  U.S.  and  Western  Europe,  there  is  little reason  to 
expect  broader  success.  Understanding  of  each  others perspectives 
is prerequisite to  building  a  stronger  relationship.  We  should 
acknowledge  and  build on  our  mutual  successes.  Close  U.S.-European 
cooperation  dominates  the  post-war  record.  But  there  are  also  irrit-
ants  and  sources  of  tension.  The  United  States  continually  hears 
European  calls  for  stronger u.s.  leadership  in  the  economic  area, 
and  specifically  in  the  monetary  area.  Yet  when  the  United  States 
does  attempt  to exercise  Leadership,  there  is  frequently  a  notable 
absence  of  European  willingness  to  follow.  This  is  not  a  recent 
phenomenon.  It  is  understandable  if there  are  differences of  view 
over  the  substance  of  such  questions.  There  inevitably  will  be. 
The  substance  can  be  debated.  But  Europe  itself  has  and  should 
acknowledge  a  growing  responsibility  to exercise  leadership,  not 
only  in  the  expression  of  its view,  but  in  contributing  to the 
solution of  common  problems.  The  responsibility  cannot  be  one-
sided,  and  Europe  collectively  has  major  potential  for  leadership 
of  its own.  What  is not  constructive  is  for  Europe  to  cloak  its 
substantive  disagreements,  and  avoid  accepting  its own  responsi-
bilities, by  resting  on  accusations  of  failure  of u.s.  will  and 
leadership.  Much  of  the  problem  may  well  relate to  the particular 
phase  of  European  efforts to  unify  through  the  Community,  it  is  in 
a  unified  Europe  that  real  and  constructive  Leadership  becomes 
possible.  But  the present  decision-making  processes  make  that  possi-
bility difficult  to  realize.  Hopefully,  this problem  will  evaporate 
as  the  unification process  evolves  - it  is generally  Least  evident 
in  the  trade  area,  where  the  European  Community  has  formal  competence  -
but  it does  represent  a  real  impediment  to  meaningful  policy  co-
ordination  on  a  global  scale." 
Brussels 
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Table  1:  Some  structural  characteristics of  the  world  economy 
1.  EC  and  Japan  GOP 
as  X of  US  GOP 
t:C-9 
Japan 
2.  Relative  shares  in  world 
trade  (excl.intra-EC  trade) 
EC-9 
Japan 
USA  ( 1> 
3.  Openness  :  imports  of  goods 
and  services as  % of  GOP 
EC-9  (2) 
Japan 
USA 
4.  Productivity  (in  ECU,  at 
current  prices and  exchange 
rates) 
- GNP  per  capita 
•  Japan 
•  USA 
•  EC-9 
- GNP  per  employed  person 
•  Japan 
•  USA 
•  EC-9 
- Compensation  per 
salary earner 
•  Japan 
•  USA 
•  EC-9 
Source:  Eurostat 
All  figures  are  rounded. 
(1)  US  :  Fob  +  10  per  cent 
1960 
54 
n.a. 
26 
5 
15 
12 
4 
n.a. 
2,655 
1,105 
n.a  • 
6,765 
2,528 
n.a. 
4,474 
1,640 
1965 
62 
13 
26 
5 
15 
11 
9 
4 
,853 
3,306 
1,627 
1,631 
8,332 
3,828 
n.a. 
5,351 
2,487 
1970 ---19_7_5  ___  1-97_9_'l, 
64  90  102 
21  33  43 
24 
8 
18 
11 
9 
5 
22 
8 
15 
13 
12 
7 
1,937  1·  3,631 
4,685  5,761 
2,438  4,290 
3,682  7,242 
11,107  13,437 
5,903  10,717 
2,434  5,702 
7,553  8,986 
3,820  7,427 
24 
9 
18 
14 
13 
10 
6,367 
7,777 
6,735 
13,119  (3) 
16,330 
16,739 
10,172  (:3) 
11,095 
11,165 
(2)  Excluding  intra-Community  trade  and  services  (estimated) 
(3)  1978 2
3
Table  2:  Currency  composition  of  international  financial  assets 
A.  Currenc~ denomination  of  Euro-market  liabilities  (1) 
1968  1970  1971  1973(2)  1974(2)  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980. 
US  dollar  ---- ------
estimate  A  76  73  77  78  79  76  74  72  75 
estimate  B  80  78  72  68  71  73  74  70  68  65  69 
Deutsche  mark  9  11  15  17  15  15  15  17  18  19  16 
Japanese  yen  1  1  1. 5  1. 5 
B.  Curren£l denomination  of official  reserves  (3) 
us  dollar  85  84  85  87  85  82  78 
Deutsche  mark  6  7  7  7  8  10  12 
Japanese  yen  .  1  1  1  2  4 
All  figures  are  rounded. 
(1)  Source  A:  Morgan  Guaranty  Survey;  an  estimate  relating  to non-European  as  well  as  to  European  markets. 
All  other  data:  BIS,  Currency  breakdown  of  external  positions  of  banks  in  the  reporting  European  countries. 
(2)  The  figures  for  official  reserves  refer  to  1973  I  and  1974  II  respectively. 
(3)  IMF,  Annual  Report,  1980 24
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CHART  IV 
FLUCTUATIONS  0~ THE  DM  AGAINST  THE  DOLLAR  AND  IN  THE  EMS  BAND 
1  USD  = 
1 .6  DM 
usn/oM 
2.0  DM 
2.2  DM 
----+ 1.125 % 
1979  1980  1981 28
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